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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20050707-CA
VERNON RENTZ,
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
AN EXCEPTION SHOULD BE MADE TO THE BARRING
OF THE APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
TO PROBATION REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
A.

The State Misstates the Facts.

In the Brief

of Appellee^

the State1 misstates the facts

when it says that, at the time Teschini effectuated the stop
of Appellant's vehicle, he "had by then been informed that
defendant

was

A

not

supposed

to have

a gun.'"

Brief

Capitalized terms not specifically defined herein are
afforded the same meaning given them on Appellant's Opening
Brief.

of

Appellee,

P. 4;

R79 at p. 28.

Teschini actually testified

that he had only received this information from Phillips. He
later testified that he had no actual knowledge that Appellant
was on probation, that he had no reason to believe he should
not have a gun, that he was unaware of any law being violated
Id.

when he executed the second stop of the vehicle.
B.

Circumstances Justifying an Exception Exist.

The State argues that the Appellant is seeking a bad
faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
at p. 5.
Appellant

Brief

of

Appellee

The State misunderstands Appellant's argument.
is not

exclusionary rule.

seeking

a bad

faith

exception

to the

Exceptions can be made to every rule

depending on the set of circumstances that are being applied
to that rule. Laws and rules are continually changing.

The

law is not a perfect science, requiring rules to be applied
differently to different cases.

Every case and every set of

circumstances differs from every other.
Appellant

is

exclusionary rule.

simply

seeking

an

exception

to

the

Appellant is not arguing that Teschini

necessarily acted in "bad faith," as it is typically known.
Appellant has relied upon cases involving bad faith in the
2

opening brief as examples to show that exceptions have been
made to the barring of the exclusionary rule to probation
revocation proceedings.

Additionally, absent any cause for

the stop, there is no definable way to articulate the actions
of Teschini without touching on "bad faith" as a possibility.
Appellant simply requests that this Court address cases with
unique circumstances, realizing that exceptions may need to be
made regarding the applicability of the exclusionary rule to
probation revocation hearings.
Law that

is applied

one way to the previous

set of

circumstances may have to be applied a little differently to
the next set of circumstances, if it is warranted, because
there may be enough differences in the circumstances that if
the law is applied that same, an individual's rights may be
violated.

Every set of circumstances needs to be evaluated

independently to determine whether it warrants some kind of an
exception.
exception

If
to

the

a

set

of

barring

circumstances
of

the

warrants

exclusionary

it,

rule

an

from

probation revocation proceedings should be made to protect the
basic constitutional rights of the public.

In the instant

matter, the public's constitutional rights are at risk because

3

a

trial

court

upheld

an

illegal

stop

effectuated

with

absolutely no cause, and an Officer now believes he is
justified in effectuating a stop given these circumstances.
The State argues that "neither Scott nor Jarman permits
exclusion of evidence on a showing of police bad faith."
Brief

of Appellee

at p. 5.

Appellant does not dispute this

statement; however, neither Scott nor Jarman contains facts
analyzing whether an exception such as the instant one should
be made. In Scott, the defendant's home was searched while on
probation and weapons were recovered, while in Jarman the
defendant was required to submit to drug testing as part of
his probation, one of which came back positive. Both of these
cases are distinguishable

based

on the

fact that their

probation status was known. Additionally, both searches were
conducted based on their probation status.

Here, Teschini

testified that he did not know Rentz was on probation and he
was not effectuating a probation search.
Based on the unique facts of the instant matter, an
exception should be made to the rules that were established
under Jarman and Scott.

Neither Jarman nor Scott addressed

the

an

issue

of

whether

exception
4

should

be

made

in

circumstances

where

a police

officer

has

no

reasonable

suspicion or cause to effectuate a stop and search of a
vehicle. Neither of them dealt with circumstances warranting
their respective defendants to successfully argue in favor of
an exception

in their particular

cases.

Cases setting

precedents, such as in Scott and Jarman, do not always address
possible exceptions if none are challenged in the matter.
Once again, rules in the legal realm are ever evolving and
different circumstances require that they be tailored to the
circumstances presented.

The circumstances of this matter

require analysis of the rules to determine if they should be
applied differently than they were to the set of circumstances
in Scott. Jarman, or any other case*
Under the unique circumstances of the instant matter, an
exception should be made to the rules under Scott and Jarman
and the exclusionary rule should apply to probation revocation
proceedings to protect an individual's basic constitutional
rights.

If the facts of this case were similar to Scott or

Jarman, then there would be no need for further analysis.
However, the facts in this case are unique and different from
Scott and Jarman and an exception is in order to protect
5

Appellant's basic constitutional rights, as well as those of
the general public.
C.

Appellant Adequately Preserved the Issues at Trial.

Next, the State argues in the Brief

of

Appellee

that

Appellant did not preserve the issue of "bad faith," Brief
Appellee

As argued supra,

at p. 6.

of

Appellant's argument in

his opening brief is not an argument of "bad faith, " as it is
typically known, but rather one of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause, which was in fact preserved at the probation
revocation hearing.

Appellant's trial counsel specifically

asked the court near the conclusion of the hearing if it was
going

to

suspicion

make

any

determinations

and probable

cause

as

issues

to

and

the
the

reasonable
trial

court

declined to do so, only articulating that, "I think it's a
real

close

question

suspicion."

R79

at

on
p.

whether
34.

there

The

was

trial

reasonable

court

had

opportunity to hear the issues and declined to do so.
issue

is best

warranted
believes

for
the

determined
such
record

by

the

trial

determination.
is

adequate

for

court,

Appellant,
a

If this

remand

is

however,

determination

reasonable suspicion and probable cause by this Court.
6

its

of

In the opening brief, Appellant

argued that Teschini

testified he did not believe that the Appellant had violated
the law by possessing a firearm when he stopped him the second
time,

Teschini even articulated that he did not know the

Appellant was on probation and that this was the first time he
had ever met him.

R79 at p. 16, 27.

Teschini specifically

stated in his testimony that he did not stop Appellant

the

second time for any violation of the law and that, when he
located the gun, he simply took it for safekeeping.
28.

Through

axiomatic

that

reasonable
Appellant

simple

analysis

Appellant's

this

challenge

suspicion justifying
at Argument 1(B).

of

is

the stop.

R79 at p.

argument,
to

the

it

is

lack

of

See, Brief

of

When coupled with the unlawful

search conducted following the unlawful stop, it is clear that
this is a matter supportive of suppression of the evidence
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
D.

Teschini's

Actions

Violated

Appellant7s

Basic

Constitutional Rights.
Appellant argues in his opening brief that Teschini could
not have acted in good faith, because there was no reasonable
suspicion or cause for him to stop the Appellant's vehicle the

7

second time, let alone confiscate his firearm. Stopping a
vehicle

without

confiscating

a

the

requisite

reasonable

firearm without

reason

suspicion

to believe

and

it is

unlawful for the individual to be in possession of one also
causes a violation of the person's constitutional right to
bear arms.

U. S.

CONST. AMEND.

II states that,

''[a] well

regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall
not be infringed." If officers believe they can confiscate an
individual's

firearm without any

reasonable

suspicion or

cause, based only upon information from someone else that they
possessed a gun, and our trial courts are willing to uphold
such action, then the public is at great risk of having their
Second Amendment rights discarded entirely.
At the time Appellant was stopped a second time, Teschini
was unaware of Appellant's probationary status.

Teschini's

belief was that Appellant was no different than an average
citizen not on probation; however, Teschini still effectuated
a

stop

without

reasonable

Appellant's weapon.
Amendment

suspicion,

and

confiscated

No one should have both their Fourth

rights to be

free
8

from unlawful

searches and

seizures

and

their

Second

Amendment

right

to

bear

arms

infringed upon simply because someone believes they have a gun
and

informs

the police.

These

rights

are basic

to our

Constitution and should be upheld in circumstances such as the
instant matter.
B.

Objective Evidentiary Justification is Required by
the Constitution.

In State v. Naiarno, this Court states that courts
should

"...zealously ^guard against police conduct which is

overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal
security without the objective evidentiary justification which
the Constitution requires.'"
P.3d 285 citing

2005 UT App 311, II 21-22, 118

Terrv at 15, 88 S.Ct. 1868. A stop cannot be

performed without objective evidentiary justification.

If

officers are allowed to initiate these types of stops, then
the rights of the public at large are in danger of being
violated.

The public has the right to drive their vehicles

without worrying that they will be stopped without cause by a
police officer.

No citizen should have to worry that they

could be stopped by a police

officer, and

their vehicle

searched, when they have not violated any laws.

9

The stop in

this matter was performed without any objective evidentiary
justification, as required by the Constitution.
testified he had no reason

Teschini

to stop Appellant the second time.

There was no evidence presented that would have given Teschini
the objective justification needed to stop the Appellant.
F.

The State Misstates Appellant Counsel's Colloquy at
Trial.

In the Brief

of Appellee,

the State argues that counsel

for the Appellant conceded at the revocation hearing that he
had researched whether his client had the right to suppression
and

could

Appellee

find

no

p. 7.

Appellant

was

support

for his position2.

This is a misstatement.
unaware

that

the

Brief

of

Counsel for the

exclusionary

rule's

applicability to probation revocation hearings was even going
to be challenged3.

R7 9 at p. 31.

Counsel had researched

issues

the

motion,

surrounding

suppression

but

had

only

2

Counsel recognizes that the representative of the State
arguing herein was not present at the probation revocation
hearing and only has the benefit of the cold record. Counsel
herein, however, was obviously present at the hearing and is
clarifying what he stated to the trial court regarding the
research issue.
3

It is important to note that the State apparently did not
anticipate raising the objection as well, since evidence and
testimony was presented prior to their having done so.

10

briefly touched on the applicability of the exclusionary rule
at probation revocation hearings.
The State did not

file any type of response

to the

suppression motion indicating their intent to challenge the
applicability of the exclusionary rule, so the hearing itself
was the first opportunity counsel had to address the matter.
The issue was not raised until the hearing was well under way
and

testimony

Because

from

counsel

Teschini

was

unaware

had
that

already
the

been

State

presented.

intended

to

challenge the applicability of the exclusionary rule, he had
not conducted comprehensive research on this particular issue.
This is apparent by the colloquy between counsel and the trial
court, as follows:
COUNSEL:

COURT:
COUNSEL:

R79 at p. 31.

And Judge, I wish I could, ah, give you
some more guidance. I have considered that
point about whether or not a suppression
issues is -is appropriate.
Didn't find any law on it? Huh?
I couldn't find anything. And I'd have to
confess again that I did come to that
realization later than the first research.
So I haven't had enough time to do that
comprehensively.
The State mistakenly attempts to argue that

counsel had undertaken comprehensive research on this issue
and had found nothing.

As evidenced by Appellant's opening
11

brief, the issue has now been comprehensively researched,
after appropriately preserving the issue at the trial court,
and support for Appellant's position has been presented.
6.

Appellant Seeks Only an Exception to Jarman and
Remand for a Hearing on the Suppression Issues.

The

State

attempts

to argue

that

the Appellant

is

requesting that this Court overrule State v. Jarman, 1999 UT
App. 269, 987 P.2d 1284.

Brief

of Appellee

at p. 11.

The

State misunderstands the argument in the Appellant's opening
brief. Appellant is not attempting to overrule Jarman in any
way, but simply wants an exception made under Jarman for
matters in which a unique set of circumstances apply.

The

exception argued herein and in Appellant's opening brief
should

be

made

to

Jarman

constitutional rights.

to

protect

every

citizen's

Without any exceptions under Jarman,

it is obvious from the circumstances of this case that there
is a possibility that very basic constitutional rights can be
violated.
If there is no cause

for an officer to pull someone over

initially, but then later it is discovered that they are on
probation, the evidence needs to be suppressed because there

12

was no cause

to stop them in the first place.

In Teschini's

view, Appellant was no different than any ordinary citizen
driving down the street at the time the stop occurred.

In t

he Appellant's opening brief, Appellant argued extensively
that

his

Fourth

Amendment

rights

were

suppression motion would have prevailed.
at pp
Brief

14-21.

of Appellee,

obvious

Brief

and

of

his

Appellant

The State failed to oppose this issue in the
although they boldly state therein that the

issues would fail on their merits. Brief
is

violated

that

the

suppression issue.

State

has

no

of Appellee
argument

p. 9.

against

It
the

The trial court even acknowledged that a

suppression motion, if entertained, would more than likely
prevail on its merits.

R 79 at p. 34.

At trial, Appellant's counsel was foreclosed from raising
the reasonable suspicion and probable cause issues by the
trial court's blanket determination that suppression issues
were inappropriate in probation revocation hearings.

R 79 at

p. 34. Counsel attempted to have the trial court address the
reasonable suspicion issue, but the trial court declined to do
so.

Should

this

Court

determine

to

allow

the

exception

requested by Appellant in this matter, Appellant requests that
13

this Court address the suppression issues in its determination
or remand the matter for a hearing before the trial court on
the suppression issues,
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE,
respectfully

based

requests

upon

the

foregoing,

Appellant

that this Court reverse the trial

court's Probation Revocation and Commitment, and remand for a
new hearing consistent with its holdings.
DATED this

day of April, 2006.

William L. Schultz
Attorney for Vernon Rentz
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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Assistant Attorney General
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P.O. Box 140854
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this Court address the suppression issues in its determination
or remand the matter for a hearing before the trial court on
the suppression issues,
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE,
respectfully

based

requests

upon
that

the

this

foregoing,

Court

reverse

Appellant
the

trial

court's Probation Rpvnr.afion and Homini fmpnt, find remand for a

new hearing consistent with its holdings.
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